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For mitigating the problems of transfer pricing formula apportionment (FA) is discussed 
intensively. However, FA could even be more harmful than transfer pricing because income 
shifting would require changing economic decisions instead of just taking advantage of 
accounting options. We analyze the impact of different international tax allocation regimes on 
a corporate group’s investment and production decisions. We show that FA offsets the 
advantages of decision decentralization as it reverses the separation of responsibilities. It is 
not clear whether FA is desirable from a fiscal or an entrepreneurial perspective. The effects 
of FA compared to transfer pricing depend strongly on the parameter setting under 
consideration, especially the decision procedure within corporate groups. 
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   1 Introduction
From an economic perspective, the integration of ﬁnancial and product markets is ubi-
quitous. This can be inferred e.g. from increased transaction volumes on international
goods and capital markets.1 Multinational groups (MNGs) account for a substantial
fraction of this global industrial output and trade. For instance, for the U.S. economy
at least 41% of international goods trades are related party sales.2 Consequently, a
major challenge for MNGs is to co-ordinate decisions of several subsidiaries located in
diﬀerent countries. Empirical evidence suggests that transfer prices (TPs) are widely
used for separating complex decisions and delegating the responsibility for the resulting
subproblems to several decision makers.3 Apart from the co-ordination function transfer
pricing is also deployed for tax purposes. Legally independent group members realize
intra-group sales and contribute to a single ﬁnal product. As a consequence, taxable
group proﬁts are frequently allocated among the participating companies by means of
transfer prices. Thus, from the group’s perspective, transfer pricing is also an important
device of international tax planning. By adjusting transfer prices, MNGs can shift their
proﬁts to low-tax legislations and reduce the group’s overall tax burden. In accordance
with this reasoning, in intra-ﬁrm contexts transfer pricing concentrates on co-ordination,
whereas in inter-ﬁrm contexts tax considerations also play an important role.
From the ﬁscal perspective, tax legislation is still a national responsibility. Until now,
the degree of international tax harmonization is negligible. Cross-border transactions
are taxed in accordance with unilateral tax laws or bilateral double taxation treaties
which assign the right to tax corporate proﬁts. The problem of allocating group proﬁts
resulting from joint operations has been solved by transfer prices based on the arm’s
length principle. This means that ﬁscal authorities accept transfer prices only if they
reﬂect prices which non-related parties would agree upon. There exist various methods
for operationalizing the arm’s length principle. Empirically, the most frequently used
methods are the cost-plus method, the comparable uncontrolled price method, and the
resale price method. However, since an external market for intermediate products often
does not exist, even these generally accepted methods show inherent discretion. Because
of that national tax authorities have to be aware of potential misuse.
From a political perspective, concern about tax tourism is growing, especially in the
EU. Here, the problem has become severe since the mid-European countries joined the
1See, e.g., van Helleman/Slomp (2002, p. 214) or Simmons (2001, p. 589).
2See U.S. Department of Commerce (2006).
3See Tang (2002, p. 42).
1EU. Due to the emerging large tax rate diﬀerentials, tax revenues of high-tax legislations
eroded. As a consequence, a discussion arose whether transfer pricing should be replaced
by formula apportionment (FA). Inspired by the U.S. example and even prior to the tax
reform proposals by the European Commission (2001), McLure/Weiner (2000) raise
the question whether FA should be implemented in the EU. Under FA, a common tax
base is calculated and divided among the host countries in accordance with the given
apportionment factors. The tax payable is computed by multiplying the apportioned
fraction of the common tax base by the unilaterally determined national tax rate. Thus,
earnings management fails to shift proﬁts to low-tax legislations because FA – in contrast
to TP – does not allow ex post discretion. At ﬁrst glance, tax base erosion seems to be
stopped by the intended change. However, for high-tax legislations FA could even be
more harmful than transfer pricing as income shifting under FA would require changing
economic decisions instead of just taking advantage of accounting options. In addition
to the erosion of tax revenues, capital investment and employment could decrease in
high-tax legislations.4
Summarizing, the economic development of international market integration adds to
the importance of transfer prices as a co-ordination instrument. However, the lack of
international tax harmonization increases the importance of transfer prices as a tax plan-
ning tool as well. In the light of these requirements transfer pricing could be overloaded,
and alternatives like FA should be discussed. However, there may exist countervailing
eﬀects of introducing FA. On the one hand, an internationally aligned tax policy could
improve economic decisions as it enhances co-ordination by means of transfer pricing.5
On the other hand, implementing FA could cause adjustments of investment and pro-
duction, harming the high-tax legislations and social production eﬃciency. Empirical
ﬁndings suggest that MNGs engage in income shifting induced by tax rate diﬀerentials,
see, e.g., Klassen/Lang/Wolfson (1993), Klassen/Shackelford (1998) for U.S. and Cana-
dian corporations, and Mintz/Smart (2004) for the Canadian case. The empirical results
published by Goolsbee/Maydew (2000) indicate that reducing the payroll weight in the
apportionment factor could substantially increase employment in the manufacturing sec-
tor.
The goal of our paper is to analyze the impact of diﬀerent international tax allocation
regimes on MNG’s investment and production decisions. In detail we want to compare
the investment and production distortions induced by transfer pricing and those induced
4See, e.g., Goolsbee/Maydew (2000).
5See, e.g., Bucks/Mazerov (1993) who discuss problems of transfer pricing and propose a reﬁned version
of FA.
2by FA. We point out that the economic consequences caused by FA in contrast to
transfer pricing heavily depend on the companies’ budgeting and accounting system.
Consequently, the overall eﬀects are much harder to predict. For several constellations
we explicitly show the impact of FA.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows: The next section gives a brief
review of the related literature on transfer prices and FA. In the third section the model
is presented. In Section four we consider the centralized decision setting and Section ﬁve
is dedicated to decentralized decision making. Both sections start with a tax-free case as
a reference; afterwards diﬀerent international tax allocation regimes are analyzed. The
paper concludes with a comparison of solutions and discussing the resulting managerial
and tax policy implications.
2 Literature Review
Our paper builds upon three strains of the literature: the theory of foreign investments,
theoretical foundations of transfer prices as an instrument of co-ordination and tax
planning, and considerations on FA as an alternative method of tax allocation.
The theory of foreign investments is reviewed e.g. in Wong (1995). It rationalizes why
many groups have subsidiaries not only in their domestic country but in many foreign
countries as well. From a corporate point of view, foreign activities are justiﬁed because
several regions may have comparative advantages in the production of particular goods
and services due to professional education, wage level, or access to raw materials, etc.
Further, the access to local markets and the performance of after-sales services is enabled
or simpliﬁed by foreign branches. Lastly, international activities could be motivated by
international tax planning, i.e., tax rate diﬀerentials are exploited.
The co-ordination function of transfer prices is extensively discussed e.g. in Grabski
(1985), Wagenhofer (1994), Anctil/Dutta (1999), Chwolka/Simons (2003), Göx/Schön-
dube (2004), Martini et al. (2005), Baldenius/Reichelstein (2006), or Lengsfeld/Pfeiﬀer/
Schiller (2006). The interaction between transfer pricing and compensation systems is
analyzed, e.g., in Besanko/Sibley (1991). Similarly, Choi/Day (1998) consider manage-
rial compensation with respect to the relation between transfer pricing and production
incentives when divisions of a MNG are located in diﬀerent countries. Smith (2002)
addresses the trade-oﬀ between tax minimization and managerial incentives, too. If a
single transfer price is used it might happen that the transfer price’s ex ante incen-
tive function dominates its ex post tax saving function. In a one-book setting, Mar-
3tini (2006) points to severe ineﬃciencies due to the dominance of tax considerations.
Nielsen/Raimondos-Møller/Schjelderup (2006) prove that decision structures are inﬂu-
enced by tax parameters. For low tax rate diﬀerentials decentralized decision procedures
may be optimal whereas high tax rate diﬀerentials might induce a centralized structure.
Finally, Elitzur/Mintz (1996) analyze tax competition under diﬀerent transfer pricing
rules from a public ﬁnance perspective.
With respect to transfer prices as a tax planning tool, Samuelson (1982) shows that
ﬁrms have an incentive to manipulate production and sales to achieve a tax advantage
under an arm’s length transfer pricing regime. Li/Balachandran (1996) present a trans-
fer pricing model that integrates asymmetric information and taxation. They compare
the eﬀects of a tax rate change under a single-price and a dual-price system. Balde-
nius/Melumad/Reichelstein (2004) as well as Hyde/Choe (2005) consider a two-book
setting concentrating on the optimality of transfer prices from the ﬁrm’s perspective.
Empirical evidence suggests that approximately 75% of the companies use the same
transfer price for tax and coordination purposes, i.e., one-book systems are implemented
frequently.6 Further, it can be conﬁrmed that cost-based transfer pricing systems are
predominant in business practice. A summary of diﬀerent empirical studies supporting
this statement is given in Table 1.7 In a more detailed study, it can actually be veriﬁed
that the predominance of cost-based transfer pricing schemes holds irrespective of the
intermediate good or service under consideration.8
Because of the obvious abusive potential of transfer pricing, FA has been an important
issue for many years in the public ﬁnance literature. Seminal papers in this ﬁeld are
Musgrave (1972) who focuses on inter-nation equity in the division of tax bases among
source countries and Gordon/Wilson (1986) who ﬁnd that FA based on three factors
creates distortions which would not occur under separate taxation. Anand/Sansing
(2000) show that participating countries of a FA area have an incentive to choose dif-
ferent apportionment formulas although social value added would be maximized by a
co-ordinated solution. Since FA would imply a major shift in corporate income taxa-
tion there are papers on issues like tax competition under FA, see, e.g., Pethig/Wagener
(2003), or Wellisch (2004), or the impact of loss oﬀset under FA, see Gérard/Weiner
(2003). Gérard (2005) computes equilibrium tax rates for separate accounting and FA
under diﬀerent loss oﬀset regimes.
Several contributions discuss FA and its tax policy implications. Shackelford/Slemrod
6See Tang (1993) or Ernst & Young (2001, p. 6).
7See Horngren/Datar/Foster (2006, p. 774).
8See Ernst & Young (2001, p. 19).
4Domestic transfer pricing methods
United New United
Method States Australia Canada Japan Zealand Kingdom
Market-based 26% 13% 34% 34% 18% 26%
Cost-based
Variable cost 3% – 6% 2% 10% 10%
Absorption or full cost 49% – 37% 44% 61% 38%
Other 1% – 3% – – 1%
Total 53% 65% 46% 46% 71% 49%
Negotiated 17% 11% 18% 19% 11% 24%
Other 4% 11% 2% 1% – 1%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Multinational transfer pricing methods
United New United
Method States Australia Canada Japan Zealand Kingdom
Market-based 35% – 37% 37% – –
Cost-based
Variable cost 0% – 5% 3% – –
Absorption or full cost 42% – 26% 38% – –
Other 1% – 2% – – –
Total 43% – 33% 41% – —
Negotiated 14% – 26% 22% – –
Other 8% – 4% – – –
Total 100% – 100% 100% – –
Table 1: Use of transfer pricing methods (source: Horngren/Datar/Foster, 2006, p. 774)
(1998) analyze the revenue implications of implementing FA on a federal level in the
U.S. They ﬁnd that using the widespread three-factor formula (“Massachusetts formula”)
would considerably increase U.S. tax liabilities of U.S.-based MNGs. However, they do
not take behavioral changes into account. Observing tax-induced distortions and tax
planning opportunities, Fox/Murray/Luna (2005) also discuss alternative income tax
structures on the state level and propose adjustments of the traditional three-factor
apportionment formula. Current tax practice in the U.S. and in Canada as well as the
tax policy implications arising from the allocation of subnational taxes are described by
Wildasin (2000).
Referring to the four versions of FA published by the European Commission, an in-
tensive debate took place. The alternative FA designs are compared by Mintz/Weiner
(2003). Sørensen (2004) shows that FA would indeed reduce some problems arising un-
der transfer pricing. However, as long as tax rate diﬀerentials remain, new distortions
5would emerge. Devereux (2004) generally appreciates the European Commission’s pro-
posals and refers to the integration of corporate and personal taxes. Hellerstein/McLure
(2004) use U.S. experience to assess the European Commission’s reform proposals. They
explore diﬃculties with regard to the apportionment factors. They suggest not to follow
the U.S. example. Depending on the choice of the apportionment formula, some trans-
fer pricing problems could remain under FA. Weiner (2002) identiﬁes some technical
and political diﬃculties and concludes that FA could – in the long run – be superior to
separate accounting if the EU becomes more integrated.
Other authors are quite skeptical about the implementation of FA in the EU, see, e.g.,
Russo (2005). Nielsen/Raimondos-Møller/Schjelderup (2003) conclude that a transition
from separate accounting to FA would not eliminate the problems of transfer pricing. In
contrast, Schäfer/Spengel (2003) prefer FA with reference to the criteria of inter-nation
equity and feasibility.
3 Economic setting
Since our goal is to analyze the international allocation of taxable proﬁts, we take the
empirical facts of divisionalization and internationalization of groups as given in our
model. Accordingly, we assume a MNG with subsidiaries in two diﬀerent countries.
The parent company is a management holding with the power to control the two other
legally independent companies.9 It raises funds for all group members, organizes capital
budgeting, determines the world-wide output, and calculates the group’s taxable income.
In contrast, the subsidiaries are responsible for investment decisions.10 They can be
distinguished into a downstream subsidiary, S1, where the ﬁnal product is assembled
and sold on the external market and an upstream subsidiary, S2, where an intermediate
product is manufactured. The structure of the ﬁrm is summarized in Figure 1.






where p denotes the market price of the ﬁnal product and x > 0 symbolizes the sales
quantity.11 The constant d > 0 is a parameter calibrating the market potential. Note,
9For a deﬁnition of control in the sense used throughout this paper see, e.g., IFRS 3.
10Although the problem of proﬁt shifting via transfer pricing occurs in the context of international
groups, typically, the same may be observed for a single company with branches in several countries.
11See Simon (1989, pp. 18) for the attributes of a multiplicative inverse demand function. Here, the
6Figure 1: Structure of the ﬁrm
that by assumption no storage takes place, i.e., sales equals production quantity. The
production costs per unit of the subsidiary Si are given as ci(Ii), i = 1,2, with




According to (2), production costs per unit depend on cost-reducing investments level
Ii > 0. The cost reducing eﬀect is scaled by the parameters ai and the lower bound
of unit costs is given by the constant ki > 0. A positive total contribution margin
requires at least to assume d
√
x > (k1 + k2)x. Proﬁtable investment and production
further require that d is suﬃciently large in relation to a1 and a2. We assume that the
sales price, calibrated by parameter d, is large enough to guarantee a positive proﬁt.
Except for the investment costs Ii ﬁxed costs are not taken into account for any of the
subsidiaries.
Subsidiary managements are remunerated on the basis of the subsidiaries’ proﬁts,
whereby intra-group transactions are valued at the transfer price τ.12 The subsidiaries’
proﬁts Πi are calculated as follows:
Π1(I1,x) = (p(x) − c1(I1) − τ)x − I1 (3)
Π2(I2,x) = (τ − c2(I2))x − I2. (4)
The contribution margin of the downstream subsidiary equals the sales price net of its
variable costs. Furthermore, S1 has to pay the transfer price τ per unit of the inter-
mediate product. The upstream subsidiary’s revenue is given by the transfer payment
received from S1 less the production and investment costs. We assume that investment
constant price elasticity is given.
12Alternatively, e.g. proﬁt sharing could be practiced.
7outlays are tax-deductible. Summing up, the group’s proﬁt Π is given by:
Π(I1,I2,x) = Π1(I1,x) + Π2(I2,x) = (p(x) − c1(I1) − c2(I2))x − I1 − I2. (5)
The timing of the model starts with the tax framework as well as the delegation and
decision structure of the ﬁrm. Since the subsidiaries are located in diﬀerent countries
no group taxation applies and the subsidiaries are taxed separately. Depending on the
decision structure a centralized or a decentralized decision procedure applies. In case of
centralized planning, the parent company’s management, P, maximizes the group’s proﬁt
Π by choosing investment levels and production quantity accordingly. This procedure
requires the parent company to have detailed and timely information about the market
and technology conditions. We assume a suﬃcient information system to be implemented
in the ﬁrm. At date 3, production, sales, proﬁts, and taxes are realized. All data become
publicly observable and all decision variables are realized as anticipated. Date 2 has to be
adapted for the decentralized case. The corresponding timeline is depicted by Figure 3
and discussed later.
Figure 2: Timeline for the centralized case
Accordingly, the model analysis falls into a centralized (Section 4) and a decentralized
(Section 5) planning regime. It is organized as follows: As a ﬁrst step investment and
production decisions are derived under centralization in a tax-free world. In a second
step taxation is introduced by considering both TP and FA. Chapter 5 is structured in
a similar way but accounts for decentralized planning procedures with various internal
accounting structures and tax allocation regimes.
4 Centralized planning
4.1 Centralized planning without taxes
Centralized planning means that the parent company decides upon investment and pro-
duction. There is no decision scope for the subsidiaries’ managements. In order to
prevent that tax eﬀects interfere with other economic variables, we assume identical cost
8structures of the subsidiaries, i.e., a1 = a2 = a and k1 = k2 = k.13 Thus, in a tax-free
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x − (I1 + I2). (6)
Since the transfer price τ vanishes, centralized planning using an exogenous transfer price
is equivalent to a one-step centralized planning according to (5). The optimal investment







− 1 = 0. (7)















x − 2kx. (9)










13Nevertheless, diﬀerent unit costs result from diﬀerent investment levels.
14Throughout the paper, we do not use second-order conditions in our optimization calculus. Instead,
we use the following approach: First, we restrict our parameters to cases where positive proﬁts
are feasible. Second, boundary solutions, i.e., x → 0, Ii → 0, x → ∞, or Ii → ∞, yield at best
zero proﬁt. Third, as the objective functions are continuously diﬀerentiable maximum points are
stationary points. Fourth, unique stationary points with positive proﬁts, therefore, are maximum
points. Fifth, in (the hypothetical) case of multiple stationary points, all of them have to be checked.
In the following, the optimal investment levels are indicated by asterisks.
9Hence, the optimal investment levels I∗



















4.2 Centralized planning under separate taxation
In this section corporate taxation based on arm’s length transfer prices is integrated
into the model with centralized planning. The subsidiaries’ tax rates are symbolized by
ti ∈ [0,1). In this setting all tax parameters are taken into account on an ex ante basis.
Hence, the group’s after-tax objective function is given by:






















The investment decision is not distorted by taxation because the optimality conditions
are equivalent to the pre-tax case. The reason for this eﬀect is that the subsidiaries’
investment decisions are separable in investments:
∂Π(I1,I2,x)
∂Ii
















10Substituting the values of (15) into the group’s after-tax objective function yields:15
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− x[(2 − t1 − t2)k + (t2 − t1)τ]. (16)














(1 − t1)d − (2 − t1 − t2)2
√
a
2[(2 − t1 − t2)k + (t2 − t1)τ]
2
. (17)






a − (2 − t1 − t2)2a
2[(2 − t1 − t2)k + (t2 − t1)τ]
. (18)
Although the optimal investment levels diﬀer from the pre-tax case for t1 6= t2, invest-
ments in both countries always coincide. The optimal total proﬁt Π∗ amounts to:
Π
∗ =




4[(2 − t1 − t2)k + (t2 − t1)τ]
. (19)
As can be inferred from (16) and (17) both the numerator and the denominator of
(19) must be positive because otherwise either proﬁt or production quantity would be
negative. This implies (2−t1−t2)k > (t1−t2)τ, meaning that a net tax shield from the
transfer price payment has to be suﬃciently small. For t1 > t2 with suﬃciently small
tax rate diﬀerentials and for t2 > t1 this condition holds. Yet, (17) may be violated for
very large tax rate diﬀerentials, i.e., t1  t2.
In case of identical tax rates, t1 = t2, the production quantity equals the one of the
tax-free world, meaning no distortions occur. In this case, the level of the transfer price
has no allocative impact. Obviously, with taxation the net group proﬁt decreases. For
15There is an ongoing discussion at which stage of the budgeting process tax planning should be
integrated. In the given context tax planning should take place on the operational level because the
optimal production quantity x may be aﬀected by taxation.
11diﬀering tax rates, the optimal production quantity is aﬀected by the transfer price τ,
assuming that production cannot be shifted between domestic and foreign production






(t1 − t2)[(1 − t1)d − 2
√
a(2 − t1 − t2)]
[(2 − t1 − t2)k + (t2 − t1)τ]
3 . (20)
Intuitively, for t2 > t1 (t1 > t2) the optimal production quantity decreases (increases)
in τ because increasing τ means shifting proﬁt to the high-tax (low-tax) country. In
the tax-reform discussion the criticism on transfer pricing focused on tax avoidance via
proﬁt shifting. Our model proves that a transfer price-based tax regime may cause real
economic distortions, too.
4.3 Centralized planning under formula apportionment
Currently, MNGs are taxed separately. However, this enables them to shift proﬁts be-
tween high-tax and low-tax jurisdictions merely by adjusting the transfer price. From a
ﬁscal perspective, less arbitrary criteria are desirable for tax allocation purposes. Hence,
recent EU tax reform proposals foster FA to allocate tax bases between EU member
states. Typical criteria are the respective national capital levels, national sum of wages,
or national turnover. Interestingly, tax distortions which might be induced by FA have
not yet been analyzed extensively. To implement FA it is necessary to deﬁne apportion-
ment factors which allocate the world-wide tax base to the respective countries. Since
wages and sales are not considered explicitly in our model the only apportionment fac-
tor is the capital stock which is given by the investment levels Ii. Note that due to
the one-period setting of our model capital stocks and investment levels coincide. As a
consequence, country i receives the fraction
Ii
I1+I2 of the total tax base. Again, we use
the tax-free world as a reference case for measuring distortions induced by taxation.
If corporate taxation is based on FA, the group’s objective function under centralized
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(1 − t1)I1 + (1 − t2)I2
I1 + I2
= 0. (24)
Conditions (22)–(24) form a system of non-linear equations for the optimal decisions,
which are diﬃcult to solve analytically. Numerical examples in the following section
show the eﬀects of FA compared to transfer pricing.
As a ﬁrst result, we observe that for identical tax rates the optimality conditions
(22)–(24) yield – like the TP regime – pre-tax investment and production decisions. For
diﬀering tax rates, however, taxation under FA has an eﬀect on investment decisions
and indirectly on the production decision. Note that we have the reverse result for the
TP regime. The distorting eﬀect of FA on investment decisions is easily veriﬁed by
checking that the pre-tax investments I1 = I2 =
√
ax do not solve (22)–(23) for t1 6= t2.
This result is intuitive since the taxation of total proﬁt depends on the subsidiaries’
investments. The rationale of the production decision is not altered by FA as can be
inferred from the equivalence of condition (24) to the pre-tax case for given investments.
The idea of this result is that the taxation of total proﬁt does not depend on quantity x
but total proﬁt does. Observe that this result is conditional on given investment levels
so that the distorting eﬀect of FA on investments carries over to the quantity actually
chosen.
With respect to optimal investment levels a simple relation can be derived, illustrating
that FA establishes an interdependence between domestic and foreign investments. From
































































From the hyperbolic function (27) in connection with (22) several insights can be gained.
Firstly, FA does not allow domestic tax authorities to set tax rates irrespective of foreign
tax rates as investment distortions occur immediately. Secondly, for rather small tax
rate diﬀerentials the marginal rate of substitution of investments is close to one, meaning
that in high-tax legislations signiﬁcant investment reactions occur just when their tax
rates approaches the low-tax legislations’ rates. Put diﬀerently, given the existing tax
rate diﬀerentials between high-tax and low-tax legislations, new investments in low-tax
legislations cause only minor investment reductions in high-tax legislations. Thirdly, tax
diﬀerentials harm economic eﬃciency, as the ﬁrst-best condition (7) is only part of (22)
and contaminated by other eﬀects. The higher the tax diﬀerential the more severe the
distortion.
4.4 Numerical examples for centralized planning
The numerical examples use the pre-tax situation as a reference case and compare it to
transfer pricing and FA under centralized planning. Table 2 summarizes the investment
and production eﬀects of both tax regimes for the parameter setting
a = 0.2, d = 10, k = 1, t1 = 0.5, t2 = 0.2.
14TP
pre-tax τ = 1.25 τ = 2 τ = 2.15 FA
I1 0.918 0.928 1.226 1.310 0.605
I2 0.918 0.928 1.226 1.310 1.344
I1 + I2 1.836 1.855 2.452 2.620 1.950
x 4.214 4.302 7.512 8.580 4.067
Π 8.428 3.980 5.259 5.620 5.750
p 4.871 4.821 3.648 3.414 4.960
T1 0 4.603 1.210 −0.178 1.263
T2 0 −0.156 1.012 1.449 1.122
T1 + T2 0 4.447 2.222 1.272 2.384
Π + T1 + T2 8.428 8.427 7.481 6.892 8.134
(T1+T2)/(Π+T1+T2) 0 52.8% 29.7% 18.5% 29.3%
Table 2: Numerical examples for centralized planning
We make the following observations:
1. For both regimes the total investment I1 + I2 increases compared to the pre-tax
case. In accordance with (20) under TP total investment increase monotonically
with increasing transfer prices. Whereas the investment levels in both countries
always coincide under TP the low-tax country attracts more investment under FA.
Depending on the tax rate diﬀerential the diﬀerences in investment levels may be
substantial.16 Due to t1 > t2 the production quantity increases for all TP cases,
see again (20). In contrast, it is decreasing for FA compared to the pre-tax case,
which reveals tax-induced ineﬃciencies. FA may even be dominated by TP, as can
be inferred from τ = 1.25. Here, a higher output is produced under the TP regime
compared to FA with lower investments.
2. Tax arbitrage is possible only for the tax regime based on transfer prices. This
result follows from a high transfer price (τ = 2.15) in connection with full loss-
oﬀset in the high-tax country (t1 > t2).17 Under FA this eﬀect does not arise
because total pre-tax proﬁts are assumed to be positive and a tax reimbursement
cannot occur. Whereas tax revenue Ti is positive under FA for both countries, tax
revenues under TP may have diﬀerent signs.
16Further FA cases not depicted here show that total investment increases compared to the pre-tax
case. The diﬀerences can be inferred from (27).
17Note that for τ = 1.25 a negative tax payment occurs as well. However, it occurs in the low tax
legislation meaning that no tax arbitrage is realized.
153. The eﬀects of the tax regime on total proﬁt Π are ambiguous. Typically, after-tax
proﬁts are lower compared to the pre-tax case. However, under TP there exist
extreme cases – violating the arm’s length principle and thus not depicted here
– in which tax arbitrage raises the after-tax proﬁt above the pre-tax level. As
explained above under FA this eﬀect does not occur.
4. The eﬀects of the tax regime on total tax revenue T1+T2 are ambiguous and depend
on the parameter setting, especially the transfer price. For several constellations,
both ﬁscal administrations may prefer TP with additional transfer payments be-
tween the countries compared to FA.
5. The eﬀects of the tax regime on total value added are ambiguous. Total value
added is measured as the sum of world-wide tax revenue and after-tax proﬁt,
Π + T1 + T2. Of course, both TP and FA fall short of the pre-tax level. Under
TP total value added may even be negative for extreme cases of tax arbitrage. In
most cases, however, total value added is positive.
6. As expected average tax rates can be manipulated under TP by setting transfer
prices accordingly. Under FA the average tax rate is an average of both nominal
tax rates weighted with the respective investment proportions. Thus, economic
manipulations are required for tax manipulation.
From a ﬁscal perspective TP might indeed suﬀer from severe weaknesses. Never-
theless, implementing FA induces ambiguous results from a ﬁscal as well as from an
entrepreneurial perspective if central planning is considered. It is not clear whether
implementing FA is advantageous at all.
5 Decentralized planning
5.1 The group’s planning procedure
In this section we assume a decentralized decision procedure. This means that several
decision makers are involved. In a typical budgeting process18 the operating budget and
the ﬁnancial budget are the key components of the master budget. Starting with the
operating budget central ﬁgures like revenues, material costs, or R&D costs are planned.
These data enter the ﬁnancial budgeting process where, amongst others, the capital
18See Zimmerman (2006, p. 291) or Horngren/Datar/Foster (2006, pp. 186).
16investment budget is deﬁned. However, this procedure is not a linear one, but “the master
budget is ﬁnalized only after several rounds of discussions between top management and
managers responsible for various business functions in the value chain.”19 This decision
procedure is represented in a stylized way in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Timeline for the decentralized case
Ex ante decentralized planning deals with information asymmetry between the parent
company and the subsidiaries with respect to price and cost data. By handing in their
investment proposals the subsidiaries supply the relevant revenue and cost data to the
parent company (date 2a). Now, the parent company can decide on the production
quantity x (date 2b). Further, as the investment proposals are conditional on the pro-
duction quantity, the parent company funds the subsidiaries with the required capital.
As a result, the investment levels are determined (date 2c). This procedure can be re-
garded as a combination of bottom-up and top-down planning. The budgeting process
resolves this information asymmetry.
Since the budgeting procedure is the result of several rounds of discussion, we assume
that no misreporting occurs. This assumption is supported by the parent company’s
commitment to accept the subsidiaries’ investment proposals instead of exploiting the
reported information for a full-scale centralized optimization of investment and produc-
tion. Basically, the investment decisions are delegated to the subsidiaries as a compen-
sation for reporting truthfully.20 Due to truth telling, the solutions for decentralized
planning remain unchanged for the case without taxes and under separate accounting,
as can be inferred from Appendix A and B, see (54) to (66). However, the solutions for
FA heavily rely on companies’ internal accounting systems as derived in the subsequent
sections.
Overall, we analyze four diﬀerent decentralized settings for FA which can be distin-
guished with respect to the degree of integration of the two subsidiaries. There exist
19Horngren/Datar/Foster (2006, p. 186).
20Note that truth-telling mechanisms exist in the literature. Since this is beyond the scope of our paper,
we assume that some kind of truth-telling mechanism is already implemented. See Groves (1973),
Weitzman (1976), Groves/Loeb (1979), Reichelstein/Osband (1984), Osband/Reichelstein (1985),
Reichelstein (1992).
17two dimensions of integration, namely the internal view considering the integration of
the subsidiaries’ objective functions and the external view considering spillovers of tax
burdens between the subsidiaries. Table 3 depicts the categories of the following FA
analysis.
External view
Internal view separated integrated
separated TP internally, FA for taxation tax allocation
(Sec. 5.2) (Sec. 5.4)
integrated proﬁt sharing full FA
(Sec. 5.3) (Sec. 5.5)
Table 3: Considered cases
In the TP/FA setting the subsidiaries’ objective functions are separated by relying on
a transfer price. Thus, the investment decisions are not inﬂuenced by FA as it is only
applied to the group’s objective function. Consequently, a shifting of tax burden between
the two subsidiaries does not occur. In contrast, the sharing of pre-tax proﬁts leads to
an integrated objective function for the subsidiaries (integration from the internal point
of view). However, tax burden shifting is not induced as tax payments are still relevant
only for the group’s decision making. In the tax allocation setting, taxation enters the
subsidiaries’ investment calculus. Although a transfer price is used in order to separate
responsibilities from an internal point of view, the tax allocation regime introduces ﬁrm-
wide tax considerations to the subsidiaries investment decisions. Thus, from an external
point of view integration is given. In the last setting, i.e. full FA, integration with
respect to both dimensions is given because in fact proﬁt sharing occurs relying on
sharing parameters resulting from the FA approach.
5.2 Decentralized planning with formula apportionment for tax
purposes only
In this section we introduce a tax system based on FA, meaning a joint tax base is
computed and distributed among the ﬁscal authorities via FA. However, the internal ob-
jective functions are separated as they still rely on transfer pricing. FA is not applied but
on the group level. Consequently, tax considerations are irrelevant for the subsidiaries’
18decisions. The according subsidiaries’ proﬁt functions read:























The optimality conditions for the subsidiaries’ investment, thus, remain undistorted






























x − I1 − I2

. (31)
The term in brackets of (31) symbolizes the proﬁt before taxes, which equals the to-
tal contribution margin less investment costs. This proﬁt before taxes is the group’s
worldwide tax base, which is allocated proportional to the subsidiaries’ capital stocks.
Country 1 receives the fraction I1/(I1 + I2) of the worldwide tax base. The fraction
I2/(I1 + I2) belongs to country 2. Since the subsidiaries’ investment levels are identical








































































































Obviously, the optimal production quantity corresponds to the pre-tax case. At ﬁrst
glance, the tax reformers’ goal is achieved as a FA-based tax regime seems to be neutral
with respect to both production and investment decisions. However, this result strongly
depends on the assumption that the subsidiaries’ proﬁts internally are still computed
using transfer prices. In this case, the decision makers’ decision making is not aﬀected
by FA elements. Unfortunately, empirical evidence suggests that corporations tend to
align managerial and ﬁnancial accounting. Accordingly, it is necessary to analyze the
eﬀects of integrating elements of FA into the subsidiaries’ proﬁt functions.
5.3 Proﬁt sharing as a tax allocation regime
A ﬁrst step to align managerial accounting with ﬁnancial accounting under FA is to
derive the subsidiaries’ objective functions from a joint proﬁt measure. A simple way
of implementing a joint objective function is to use proﬁt sharing.21 Note that in this
section tax considerations resulting from FA still belong to the group level. Therefore
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x − I1 − I2

, (37)
21See, e.g., Milgrom/Roberts (1992, pp. 413).


























































































Obviously, FA combined with internal proﬁt sharing ensures decision scenarios equiv-
alent to the pre-tax case or FA for tax purposes only with transfer pricing for internal
control purposes.
5.4 Allocation of taxes to subsidiaries’ proﬁts
Hitherto, the subsidiaries’ decision making does not take FA taxation into account.
Consequently, their decisions might not be optimal from the group’s perspective. One
attempt to remedy this problem is that P eﬀectively integrates taxation into the sub-
sidiaries’ objective functions.
This section analyzes a setting in which internal accounting separation via transfer
pricing is induced by an allocation of the FA tax burden to the respective subsidiary.
More precisely, each subsidiary is charged with a fraction of the total tax burden identical
to the corresponding apportionment factor. In our opinion, this is a likely situation
given the EU tax reform proposals. For internal control purposes, groups will further
rely on national proﬁt & loss accounts, whereas taxes are not calculated in such detail.
Rather, they are simply divided up in the same manner as they are apportioned for tax
purposes. Consequently, the subsidiaries’ net proﬁts are computed in a hybrid form.
The ﬁrst component comes from individual accounts. The second component is just a
push-down allocation of group-wide taxes.
Given the group applies this kind of tax planning severe implications for decentral-
21ization arise. Contrary to the above cases the subsidiaries need information about the
other subsidiary’s data: FA requires a group-wide perspective on each subsidiary’s level.
Otherwise, optimizing behavior would not be possible. The downstream subsidiaries’
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− 2kx − I1 − I2
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− 2kx − I1 − I2

. (45)
From (43) and (45) it can be seen that the derivatives contain the ﬁrst-best optimality
condition (7). However, by subtracting the second term, the optimal investment levels
will be reduced. The reason for this decrease is that the higher a subsidiary’s investment
the higher the fraction of the world-wide tax base which is allocated to it. In contrast
22to the previous sections, the subsidiaries’ investment levels are inter-dependent, which is
caused by the apportionment factor. Consequently, the intended autonomy of the sub-
sidiary managers is oﬀset as they have to take into consideration the investment calculus
of the other manager. Hence, the subsidiaries’ investments have to be coordinated.
In principle, there exist analytical solutions for the stationary points of (43) and
(45) yielding equilibrium investments. However, these are too complicated for useful
economic interpretations,22 even for identical tax rates. See Appendix C for a numerical
solution approach.
5.5 Full formula apportionment regime
Full alignment of managerial and ﬁnancial accounting is achieved when FA is used for
both internal proﬁt allocation among subsidiaries and for taxation. From the internal
as well as from the external perspective the subsidiaries’ objective functions then are
integrated. We call this scenario full FA.














x − I1 − I2 (46)
is allocated to subsidiary Si according to the apportionment factor Ii/I1 +I2 and taxed
at the national tax rate ti. For subsidiary Si this leads to the following proﬁt function:















x − I1 − I2

. (47)
From this objective function it follows immediately that the tax rates t1 and t2 are
22The analytical solutions only for ∂Π1/∂I1 = 0 cover more than 450 single-spaced pages.
23irrelevant for the investment decisions.
∂Πi(I1,I2,x)
∂Ii
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As in the previous section, the subsidiaries’ investment levels are inter-dependent, which
is caused by the apportionment factor. Hence, the subsidiaries’ investments have to
be coordinated. This can be modelled by applying the concept of Nash equilibria with
(49) representing the corresponding reaction functions. The ﬁrst step to calculate the
equilibrium is to conclude from (48) that equilibrium investments are equal due to the




















I1 = I2. (50)



















































































































































Although the explicit expression for optimal quantity x∗ is too complicated to be dis-
played here, it can be seen from (53) that the optimal production quantity is unaﬀected
by the tax rates and depends only on the pre-tax parameters a, d, and k. Moreover, it is
undistorted compared to the pre-tax tax for given investment levels. However, note that
due to tax-induced distortion of the optimal investment levels the optimal production
quantity is altered compared to the previous sections as well. Thus, all kinds of economic
decisions are distorted under a full-FA regime.
5.6 Numerical Results
For additional insight, this section provides a numerical comparison of the diﬀerent tax
allocation regimes under decentralized planning. The numerical results are based on the
parameter setting introduced in Section 4.4:
a = 0.2, d = 10, k = 1, t1 = 0.5, t2 = 0.2, τ = 2.
Table 4 shows the optimal values in the pre-tax case and for transfer pricing which
correspond to the optimal values under centralized planning. The two columns on the
right hand side represent the results for allocation of taxes to subsidiaries’ proﬁts (Sec-
tion 5.4) and full FA (Section 5.5). The optimal investment and production levels for
proﬁt sharing (Section 5.3) correspond to the transfer-pricing case and are not displayed
25separately.
tax
pre-tax TP allocation full FA
I1 0.918 1.226 0.499 3.091
I2 0.918 1.226 0.731 3.091
I1 + I2 1.836 2.452 1.230 6.181
x 4.214 7.512 4.273 5.008
Π 8.428 5.259 5.435 3.597
p 4.871 3.648 4.838 4.469
T1 0 1.210 1.626 1.383
T2 0 1.012 0.952 0.553
T1 + T2 0 2.222 2.579 1.937
Π + T1 + T2 8.428 7.481 8.014 5.533
Table 4: Numerical examples for decentralized planning
Table 4 allows the following conclusions:
1. Comparing the results of Sections 5.4 and 5.5 one of the most striking results is
that FA may induce underinvestment as well as overinvestment compared to the
pre-tax case. This eﬀect can be seen from total investment I1 + I2.
2. In contrast to centralized planning, the investment levels in both countries coincide
for full FA. If taxes based on FA are allocated to subsidiaries’ proﬁts, however,
the low-tax country attracts more investment. Again, depending on the tax rate
diﬀerential the investment levels may diﬀer substantially. In all cases observed the
investment levels under tax allocation decrease sharply, even for identical tax rates
t1 = t2.
3. In the cases depicted here the production quantity increases compared to the pre-
tax case. However, this result cannot be generalized.
4. With regard to tax arbitrage the results from centralized planning apply.
5. The eﬀects of the tax regime on total proﬁt Π are ambiguous. Hence, it is not
clear whether switching to FA is desirable from a corporate perspective.
6. As under centralized planning the eﬀects of the tax regime on total tax revenue,
T1 + T2, are ambiguous. There exist parameter settings under which both ﬁscal
administrations may prefer TP with additional transfer payments between the
countries compared to FA.
267. Again, the eﬀects of the tax regime on total value added are ambiguous.
6 Conclusions and Implications
As a contribution to the ongoing discussion on the possible introduction of FA in the
European Union we analyze investment and production eﬀects of diﬀerent tax allocation
regimes under various internal decision structures of a MNG. Under centralized as well
as decentralized planning the eﬀects of FA compared to TP are ambiguous.23 This
qualitative result is valid with regard to
• total investment,
• production,
• total tax revenue, and
• total value added.
Apart from this general ambiguity the investment and production eﬀects under decen-
tralized planning diﬀer substantially from those under centralized planning. The most
striking result can be observed for full FA. Under decentralized planning this tax alloca-
tion regime induces identical investment levels in both countries irrespective of the tax
rates. In contrast, the low-tax country attracts more investment if centralized planning
is applied in the MNG.
Obviously, the MNG’s decision structure has a decisive impact on the tax system’s
investment, production, tax revenue, and value added eﬀects. The examples provided
in this paper reveal that – depending on the decision procedure – FA may or may not
violate neutrality. As a result, reliable forecasts of the eﬀects of introducing FA are
not possible unless the group’s organizational structure is known. Since MNGs have no
incentive to disclose their internal decision procedures, there is little chance to obtain
useful predictions of the likely eﬀects of FA. The results of the public ﬁnance literature
concerning FA have to be interpreted in light of this constraint.
However, even if researchers had empirical results about MNGs’ current internal de-
cision structures the adjustments after a possible reform of the tax allocation regime
would remain unknown. The reason for this problem is that MNGs’ decision procedures
are endogenous variables that depend on the tax framework.24 This insight complicates
tax analyses dramatically: If the decision situation is tax-dependent it seems almost
impossible to derive neutral tax systems that could serve as a yardstick to quantify tax
23The eﬀects are summarized in Table 5
24See Nielsen/Raimondos-Møller/Schjelderup (2006).
27eﬀects.
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33A Decentralized planning without taxes
In a tax-free world, the group’s proﬁt function Π reads
Π(I1,I2,x) = (p(x) − c1 (I1) − c2 (I2))x − I1 − I2. (54)
The transfer price τ is used to divide the group’s proﬁt into the subsidiaries’ proﬁts Π1
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x − I2. (56)
Given these proﬁts it is possible for the subsidiaries’ managements to derive the optimal













































































34The optimal production quantity corresponds to x∗ as derived in equation (10). The
























































Obviously, the optimal investment levels are identical to the ones set by the parent
company. Overall, optimal investment levels and production quantity are not aﬀected
by the transfer price τ.
B Decentralized planning under separate taxation
Under separate taxation two diﬀerent functions of transfer prices have to be considered,
as they are needed to determine the tax bases of parent and subsidiaries independently.
Neglecting taxation, transfer prices are a prerequisite for proﬁt center organization as
they allow to separate the subsidiaries’ proﬁts. According to current tax law both
subsidiaries are taxed separately and are not allowed to ﬁle jointly. The transfer price is
given exogenously as a comparable uncontrolled price. Hence, it cannot be optimized.
Corresponding to (13) the proﬁt functions of the subsidiaries are:























Diﬀerentiating with respect to Ii yields
∂Πi(Ii)
∂Ii













which results from the tax-free case by multiplying by (1−ti). The investment decisions
remain undistorted as the tax system fulﬁlls the neutrality requirement here. However,
inspecting the group’s calculus shows that the production quantity x is distorted. The
35proﬁt function is:



























ax − kx − τx



















+x[(−k − τ)(1 − t1) + (τ − k)(1 − t2)]. (65)
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√
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(1 − t1)d − 2
√
a(2 − t1 − t2)




(1 − t1)d − 2
√
a(2 − t1 − t2)
2[(2 − t1 − t2)k + (t2 − t1)τ]
2
. (66)
As in the pre-tax case decentralized planning yields the same production quantity as
centralized planning which was given by (17).
C Decentralized planning with tax allocation














































− 2kx − I1 − I2
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(67)
= Π1 + Π2 (68)
36with respect to quantity x anticipating the subsidiaries’ equilibrium investment reactions
I∆













































































Unfortunately, analytical solutions of I∆
i (x) and thus for (69) are prohibitively com-
plicated. Even a straight numerical solution approach using standard software tools is
likely to be infeasible. Nevertheless, it is possible to derive optimal results numerically
by following two steps. First, exploit the fact that the partial derivatives ∂Πi/∂Ii vanish
according to (43) and (45) which simpliﬁes (69) considerably. Second, apply the im-











In total, this results in the following system of equations that has to be solved numerically
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